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Abstract 
Aims: Patients with Multiple Sclerosis (MS) experience higher rates of emotional 
disorders than comparison groups with similar levels of disability. More information is 
needed regarding the differences between individual reactions to conditions such as MS. 
The present study examined the extent to which the theory of cognitive adaptation 
(TCA) can explain variance in psychological adjustment among patients with MS.  
Method: At time 1, 112 participants with MS completed measures of the TCA variables 
(i.e., meaning, mastery, self-enhancement and optimism), anxiety, depression and 
quality of life. Three months later, 94 participants completed measures of anxiety, 
depression and quality of life. 
Results: Optimism explained significant amounts of variance in time 1 anxiety (∆R2 
= .17), depression (∆R2 = .18) and mental well-being (∆R2 = .12),  but failed to explain 
significant variance in time 2 adjustment. The situated TCA variables explained 
significant amounts of additional variance in time 1 anxiety (∆R2 = .16) and depression 
(∆R2 = .12) over and above optimism, but failed to explain significant variance in time 2 
adjustment. Finally, the situated TCA variables mediated the effect of optimism on 
anxiety, depression and mental well-being at time 1 but not time 2.  
Conclusions: Partial support was found for the TCA cross-sectionally but not 
prospectively. In addition, contrary to the TCA, benefit finding was found to be related 
to poorer psychological adjustment prospectively. Future research could investigate the 
role of benefit finding in adjustment to provide insight into the range of alternative 
explanations. The clinical implications of the study are considered.  
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Introduction 
Multiple Sclerosis 
Multiple Sclerosis (MS) is a chronic, progressive and degenerative disease, in which the 
body’s natural defences attack the myelin sheath that surrounds nerve cells in the brain 
and spinal cord. The subsequent scarring blocks or delays the passage of nerve impulses 
and produces a unique range of symptoms for each individual. These symptoms can 
include: fatigue, bladder and bowel dysfunction, sexual dysfunction, pain, impaired 
mobility, paralysis, visual impairment, abnormal sensations and cognitive impairment 
(Pakenham, 2007). MS is the most common neurological condition experienced by 
young people in western societies and currently affects approximately 52,000 to 62,000 
people in England and Wales (NICE, 2003).  
 
Age of onset is between 20 and 50 years in 70% of cases and is 2.5 times more likely 
among women than men (NICE, 2003). Risk of onset is increased for individuals with a 
Caucasian European origin or a family history of MS (Royal College of Physicians, 
2004). Most people with MS have a normal life expectancy although men have a worse 
prognosis than women usually experiencing higher levels of disability. The cost of MS 
is estimated to be 1.34 billion a year with informal care accounting for approximately 
26% of this and the NHS spending approximately £3,400 a year on each patient (Kobelt 
et al., 2000). The psychosocial consequences of experiencing such severe multiple 
disabilities can be profound with individuals experiencing disruptions in their daily 
activity as well as family, social and occupational life (Pakenham, 2008). 
 
The process of adjusting to MS is complicated by the experience of multiple disabilities 
and widespread psychosocial consequences. Research has found that individuals with 
MS exhibit a higher prevalence of emotional disorders than other patients with 
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comparable physical disability (Rao, Huber & Bornstein, 1992). Depression is 
experienced by approximately 27% to 47% of people with MS (Patten et al., 2003). 
Individuals with MS have also been found to experience high levels of anxiety, between 
16% to 48% (Nicholl, Lincoln & Francis, 2001), and lower quality of life than 
community comparison groups (McCabe & McKern, 2002). However, not all 
individuals with MS experience negative psychological consequences. As a result, some 
research has tried to explore differences between individuals in their reactions to 
chronic illnesses such as MS in the hope of increasing our understanding of what factors 
may contribute to positive adjustment and better psychological well-being.  
 
Theory of Cognitive Adaptation (TCA) 
Taylor’s (1983) theory of cognitive adaptation (TCA) proposes that positive adjustment 
to a health threat, such as MS, is related to an individual’s ability to find meaning in the 
illness experience, regain mastery over the health threat and restore self-esteem. Thus, 
the TCA considers three themes when assessing individuals’ reactions to a health threat; 
meaning, mastery and self-esteem. In particular, the TCA highlights the importance of 
forming positive beliefs in relation to these three themes, which is likely to be aided by 
having an optimistic outlook. Thus, according to the TCA, dispositional optimism is 
likely to help individuals form positive beliefs regarding meaning, mastery and self-
esteem which, in turn, will be related to more positive adjustment (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Diagrammatic Representation of the Theory of Cognitive Adaptation (TCA). 
 
Meaning 
The first theme, meaning, refers to efforts to understand what has happened. Taylor 
(1983) suggests that there are two pathways to finding meaning, which are making 
sense and benefit finding. The first pathway, making sense, refers to an individual’s 
efforts to make sense of their situation by making causal attributions (Davis, Nolen-
Hoeksema & Larson, 1998). The second pathway, benefit finding, refers to an 
individual’s efforts to find benefits from their situation by positively reappraising their 
situation (Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema & Larson, 1998). Taylor (1983) proposes that higher 
levels of making sense and benefit finding will be related to better psychological 
adjustment.   
 
Mastery  
The second theme, mastery, refers to efforts to regain a sense of control over the health 
threat. Taylor (1983) suggest that there are two pathways to regaining a sense of 
mastery, which are primary control and secondary control. The first pathway, primary 
control, refers to an individual’s efforts to increase the level of personal control they 
Dispositional 
Optimism 
Psychological
Adjustment 
 Making Sense 
Theme 1: Meaning 
  Primary Control 
  Theme 2: Mastery 
  Social Comparison 
  Theme 3: Self-esteem 
Benefit Finding 
Secondary Control 
  Denial of Illness Impact 
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believe they have over their illness and its management (Rothbaum, Weisz & Snyder, 
1982). The second pathway, secondary control, refers to an individual’s ability to accept 
and accommodate their illness (Rothbaum, Weisz & Snyder, 1982). Taylor (1983) 
proposes that higher levels of primary control and secondary control will be related to 
better psychological adjustment. 
 
Self-esteem 
The third theme, self-esteem, refers to efforts to regain a sense of self-esteem. Taylor 
(1983) suggests that there are two pathways that bolster self-esteem, which are social 
comparisons and denial of illness impact. The first pathway, social comparisons, refers 
to an individual’s attempts to bolster their self-esteem by comparing themselves to 
others in a favourable way (Wills, 1981). The second pathway to bolstering self-esteem, 
denial of illness impact, refers to an individual’s efforts to increase their self-esteem by 
minimising the true severity of their situation (Helgeson, 1999). Taylor (1983) proposes 
that positive social comparisons and higher levels of denial of illness impact will be 
related to better psychological adjustment. 
 
Dispositional Optimism 
Taylor (1983) proposes that the situated variables, meaning (i.e., benefit finding and 
making sense), mastery (i.e., primary and secondary control) and self-esteem (i.e., social 
comparisons and denial), mediate the relationship between dispositional optimism and 
psychological adjustment. In other words, the more optimistic an individual is the more 
they will be able to develop positive beliefs that give them a sense of meaning, mastery 
and self-esteem which, in turn, is likely to lead to positive adjustment.  
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The TCA and Chronic Illness 
Previous research has investigated the theory of cognitive adaptation (Taylor, 1983) in 
relation to health threats such as cancer (Stiegelis et al., 2003; Tomich & Helgeson, 
2006), heart disease (Helgeson, 1999, 2003; Helgeson & Fritz, 1999) and venous 
thromboelic disease (Moore, Norman, Harris & Makris, 2006). These longitudinal 
studies with large sample sizes, validated measures and sophisticated analyses provide 
strong empirical support for the TCA in health conditions other than MS as they each 
found the theory of cognitive adaptation was able to explain significant amounts of 
variance in psychological adjustment. However, no previous research has investigated 
the ability of the TCA to explain psychological adjustment in MS.  
 
The TCA and Multiple Sclerosis 
Although no study has investigated the components of the TCA simultaneously in MS, 
a small number of studies have investigated some of the individual components of the 
TCA in MS. However, the research in this area suffers from a range of methodological 
limitations. Therefore, the strength of the evidence base for the theory of cognitive 
adaptation with patients who have multiple sclerosis is currently poor.  
 
Meaning and Adjustment to MS 
A number of studies have examined the role of meaning in psychological adjustment to 
MS. In line with the TCA, greater efforts at finding meaning have been found to be 
related to better psychological adjustment. Considering the first pathway to meaning, 
higher levels of making sense have been found to be related to lower levels of 
depression and anxiety (Pakenham, 2007, 2008) as well as higher quality of life (Russell, 
White & White, 2006) in multiple sclerosis. Considering the second pathway to 
meaning, higher levels of benefit finding have been found to be related to higher quality 
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of life (Pakenham, 2005) and lower levels of depression (Hart, Vella & Mohr, 2008) in 
multiple sclerosis. However, although three studies were longitudinal with large 
samples and multivariate analyses that controlled for significant covariates (Hart el al., 
2008; Pakenham, 2007, 2008), the other studies were cross-sectional, underpowered and 
poorly analysed (Pakenham, 2005; Russell et al., 2006).   
 
Mastery and Adjustment to MS 
Although some research has examined the role of mastery in psychological adjustment 
to MS, this research has only explored the first pathway to mastery, primary control, 
and not the second pathway, secondary control. In line with the TCA, higher levels of 
primary control have been found to be related to higher quality of life  (Bishop, Frain & 
Tschopp, 2008) and lower levels of depression (Mendoza, Pittenger & Weinstein, 2001) 
in multiple sclerosis. However, the limited number of studies concerning primary 
control and the lack of research concerning secondary control are weaknesses. The 
available evidence is also methodologically weak as it is cross-sectional, underpowered, 
and poorly analysed (i.e., lack of multivariate analyses).  
 
Self-esteem and Adjustment to MS 
Research that has examined the role of self-esteem in psychological adjustment to MS, 
has only considered the first pathway to boosting self-esteem, social comparisons, and 
not the second pathway, denial of illness impact in MS. In line with the TCA, two 
studies found that negative downward social comparisons (“I’m going to end up as ill as 
them”) and negative upward social comparisons (“I’ll never cope as well as them”) 
were related to poorer psychological well-being (Dewar, 2003; Russell et al., 2006). 
However, the limited availability of research in this area, cross-sectional designs, and 
small samples sizes limit this evidence base.   
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Dispositional Optimism and Adjustment to MS 
In line with the TCA, some research has found that higher levels of dispositional 
optimism were related to better psychological adjustment in multiple sclerosis. Higher 
levels of dispositional optimism have been found to be related to lower levels of 
depression (Fournier, Ridder & Bensing, 1999, 2002; Gold-Spink, Sher & Theodos, 
2000; Ridder, Schreurs and Bensing, 2000), lower levels of anxiety (Fournier, Ridder & 
Bensing, 1999, 2002) and higher quality of life (Ridder, Schreurs & Bensing, 2000) in 
multiple sclerosis. However, these studies have a number of methodologically 
limitations. They are cross-sectional and typically underpowered. In addition, they have 
failed to assess covariates or employ multivariate analyses.  
 
Mediation Hypothesis 
According to the TCA, beliefs about meaning, mastery and self-esteem should mediate 
the relationship between dispositional optimism and psychological adjustment. Only 
one study has explored this mediation hypothesis and this study only examined the 
mediating role of benefit finding. This longitudinal large scale study by Hart, Vella and 
Mohr (2008) found that benefit finding mediated the relationship between optimism and 
depression; higher levels of dispositional optimism were related to higher levels of 
benefit finding which, in turn, were related to lower levels of depression and mediated 
the effect of dispositional optimism on depression. Despite the strength of this study, 
there is a need for further studies to examine whether beliefs about mastery and self-
esteem, as well as meaning, mediate the influence of dispositional optimism on 
psychological adjustment to MS. 
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Summary 
In summary, research into multiple sclerosis has found partial support for the theory of 
cognitive adaptation. However,  the strength of the current evidence base is weak. First, 
no study has investigated all of the components of the theory of cognitive adaptation 
simultaneously in MS preventing a thorough exploration of the hypothesised 
relationships. Second, only three studies were longitudinal (Hart et al., 2008; Pakenham, 
2007, 2008). The other studies were cross-sectional preventing causal inferences 
regarding the direction of any relationships that were found. Third,  sample sizes ranged 
from 18 participants (Gold-Spink et al., 2000) to 408 participants (Hart et al., 2008). 
Smaller samples were underpowered and at increased risk of making a type II error. 
Fourth, all of the studies relied on self-report questionnaires. Therefore, the findings are 
threatened by self-report bias and common method variance. Fifth, only three studies 
assessed potential covariates and employed multivariate statistical analyses (Hart et al., 
2008; Pakenham, 2007, 2008). The findings from the other studies are threatened by a 
broad range of confounding variables. 
 
Therefore, the present study aimed to overcome the limitations of the existing evidence 
base by 1) investigating all of the components of the theory of cognitive adaptation 
simultaneously, 2) in a large sample of individuals with multiple sclerosis, 3) using a 
longitudinal (i.e., prospective) design, 4) that assesses potential covariates, and 5) 
conducts multivariate statistical analyses to control for the effects of significant 
demographic and clinical variables.  
 
Aims 
The overall aim of the present study was to examine the extent to which the theory of 
cognitive adaptation explains variance in adjustment in patients with multiple sclerosis.  
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Hypotheses 
After controlling for significant demographic and clinical variables: 
1. Dispositional optimism will explain a significant amount of variance in anxiety, 
depression, mental well-being and physical well-being at baseline and at three 
month follow-up. 
2. Making sense, benefit finding (i.e.,  meaning), primary control, secondary control 
(i.e., mastery), social comparisons and denial of illness impact (i.e., self-esteem) 
will explain a significant amount of additional variance in anxiety, depression, 
mental well-being and physical well-being over and above that of dispositional 
optimism at baseline and at three month follow-up.  
3. Making sense, benefit finding (i.e.,  meaning), primary control, secondary control 
(i.e., mastery), social comparisons and denial of illness impact (i.e., self-esteem) 
will mediate the effect of dispositional optimism on anxiety, depression, mental 
well-being and physical well-being at baseline and at three month follow-up.  
 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Ethical approval was granted by the South Yorkshire Research Ethics Committee (see 
Appendix B). Participants were recruited from a weekly outpatient clinic for people 
with Multiple Sclerosis between October 2009 and February 2010. The neurology 
consultant invited patients to participate if they had an existing diagnosis of Multiple 
Sclerosis, were aged 18 or over, spoke English, and had the physical, cognitive and 
language skills required to complete the questionnaire measures. Patients who did not 
meet these criteria were excluded from the study (n = 16). The most common reason for 
exclusion was the lack of a formal diagnosis of MS.  
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A total of 159 patients were invited to participate. Eight declined describing a lack of 
time or interest. The other 151 patients were interested in participating and were 
introduced to the researcher who provided them with an information sheet (see 
Appendix D), which was discussed in detail, a copy of the consent form (see Appendix 
D), a copy of the time 1 questionnaire (see Appendix C) and a freepost self-addressed 
envelope. The time 1 questionnaire measured the predictor variables and the outcome 
variables. 
 
Out of the 151 patients who were invited to participate, 112 provided informed consent 
and returned their time 1 questionnaire (74% response rate). The 112 participants who 
took part at time 1 (85 females and 27 males) had a mean age of 47.4 years (SD = 10.35, 
range 22-75 years) and a mean MS duration of 11.2 years (SD = 8.01, range 2 months-
38 years). Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the demographic and clinical 
variables at time 1. The majority of participants were married (55%), employed (35%), 
had a diagnosis of relapsing/remitting type MS (71%) and were currently experiencing a 
period of remission (56%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the demographic and clinical variables at time 1.  
 
 
Variable     Range         Mean       SD       Skewness    Kurtosis 
              (Z score)    (Z score) 
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Age (years) 22-75   47.4  10.35  1.79 -0.21 
MS Duration (years) 0.2-38   11.2    8.01  5.35***  2.57 
MS Severity (score) 0.0-22   17.7    2.91    -7.55***  1.45 
 
    
Variable N % 
 
 
Gender Male 27 24 
 Female 85 76 
 
Marital Status Single 26 23 
 Married 62 55 
 Divorced 13 12 
    Separated     2            2 
    Widowed     5            4 
    Co-habiting     4            4 
 
Employment   Employed   39          35 
    Unemployed   24          22 
    Retired   26          23 
    Student     5            4 
    Homemaker   18          16 
 
Medication  Pain   No    78          70 
     Yes    34          30 
        Fatigue   No             102              91 
     Yes    10                   9 
         Depression  No    93          83 
     Yes    19          17 
         Relapse   No    62          55 
     Yes    50          45 
 
MS Diagnosis   Relapsing/Remitting  79          71 
    Secondary Progressive 19          17 
    Primary Progressive  14          12 
 
MS Status   Current Relapse  17          15 
    Remitting   62          56 
    Progressing   25          22 
    Stable      8            7 
Note: ***p<.001. 
 
The time 2 questionnaire (see Appendix C), at three months, measured the outcome 
variables depression, anxiety and quality of life. A copy of the time 2 questionnaire, a 
free post self-addressed envelope and a copy of the information sheet were posted to 
participants who confirmed they still consented to taking part. All 112 participants 
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provided consent for this process. In total, 94 participants returned their time 2 
questionnaire (84 % response rate).  
 
To investigate the possibility of attrition biases, independent t-tests and chi-square tests 
were performed to identify whether any significant differences existed between 
participants who completed both the time 1 and time 2 questionnaires and participants 
who only completed the time 1 questionnaire. Differences between these two groups 
were investigated for each of the demographic, clinical, predictor and outcome variables. 
These tests found no significant differences between the two groups of participants.   
 
Measures of Predictor Variables Assessed at Time 1 
Optimism 
The Revised Life Orientation Test (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994) was used 
to measure dispositional optimism. The LOT-R is comprised of six items (e.g., “Overall, 
I expect more good things to happen to me than bad”) and four filler items, which are 
scored on a five point scale from 0 (I disagree a lot) to 4 (I agree a lot). High scores 
indicate high levels of optimism. The internal reliability of the LOT-R was good for the 
present study (α = .87). 
 
Meaning 
The perceived benefits subscale of the Illness Cognition Questionnaire (ICQ; Evers et 
al., 2001) was used to provide a situated measure of benefit finding. This subscale 
contains six items (e.g., “My illness has helped me realise what’s important in life”), 
which are scored on a four point scale from 1 (not at all) to 4 (completely). High scores 
indicate high levels of benefit finding. The internal reliability of this subscale was good 
for the present study (α = .88). 
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The illness coherence subscale of the Revised Illness Perception Questionnaire (IPQ-R, 
Moss-Morris et al., 2002) was used to provide a situated measure of making sense. This 
subscale has five items (e.g., “I have a clear picture or understanding of my illness”), 
which are scored on a five point scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). 
High scores indicate high levels of making sense. The internal reliability of this 
subscale was good for the present study (α = .86). 
 
Mastery 
The personal control subscale of the Revised Illness Perception Questionnaire (IPQ-R, 
Moss-Morris et al., 2002) was used to provide a measure of situated primary control 
(personal control). This subscale has six items (e.g., “My actions will have no affect on 
the outcome of my illness”), which are scored on a five point scale from 0 (strongly 
disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). High scores indicate high levels of personal control. The 
internal reliability of this subscale for the present study was satisfactory (α = .73). 
 
The acceptance subscale of the Illness Cognition Questionnaire (ICQ; Evers et al., 2001) 
was used to provide a measure of situated secondary control (i.e., accommodation to the 
threat). This subscale has six items (e.g., “I have learned to accept the limitations 
imposed by my illness”), which are scored on a four point scale from 1 (not at all) to 4 
(completely). High scores indicate high levels of accommodation to the threat. The 
internal reliability of this subscale for the present study was good (α = .87). 
Self-Enhancement 
Havik and Maeland’s (1986) two items for measuring denial of illness impact (e.g., “It 
takes more than a relapse to make me fall apart”) were used to provide a situated 
measure of self-esteem. These items are scored on a five point scale from 0 (strongly 
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disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). High scores indicate high levels of self-esteem. A 
significant positive correlation was found between these two items, r(110) = .47, p 
<.001. 
 
Four subscales from the Social Comparison in Illness Scale (SCIS; Dibb & Yardley, 
2006a) were used to measure social comparisons. These were the upward positive, 
upward negative, downward positive, and downward negative subscales. The four 
subscales are comprised of 16 items (e.g., “When I hear about people with milder 
symptoms I feel hopeful”), which are scored on a five-point scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The upward positive and upward negative 
subscales in this study had good internal reliability (α = .94 and .85 respectively). 
Correlational analyses found a significant positive relationship between the two items of 
the downward negative subscale (r(110) = .42, p <.001) and between the two items of 
the downward positive subscale (r(110) = .79, p <.001). 
 
Measures of the Outcome Variables Assessed at Time 1 and Time 2 
Anxiety and Depression 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) was 
used to measure levels of anxiety and depression. The scale has 14 items and two 
subscales. Seven items measure depression and seven items measure anxiety. The items 
are scored on a four point scale to indicate the degree to which they have been 
experienced during the previous week. High scores indicate high levels of anxiety or 
depression. The depression subscale and the anxiety subscale had good internal 
reliability in this study at time 1 (α = .80 and .88 respectively) and time 2 (α = .83 
and .86 respectively). 
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Demographic and Clinical Variables 
Information regarding the age, gender, marital status and employment status was 
collected when participants met the researcher. The Barthel Index (BI; Mahoney & 
Barthel, 1965) was used to measure MS severity (functional ability). The BI has ten 
items that assess functional ability for 10 activities of daily living (e.g., toileting, 
bathing, dressing etc). Items are scored on a scale that ranges from 0 to 1, 0 to 2 or 0 to 
3 depending upon the activity of daily living that is being assessed. High scores indicate 
high functional ability. The internal reliability of this scale for the present study was 
satisfactory (α = .79). Information regarding MS diagnosis, duration, medication, and 
MS status was collected from medical records at the clinic, with permission from 
participants (see Table 1).  
 
 
 
 
Statistical Analysis  
Data Screening  
Normality of  Distributions 
Skewness and kurtosis statistics were calculated to investigate whether the study 
variables were normally distributed. Variables that were not normally distributed were 
transformed to reduce their level of skewness or kurtosis to a non-significant level. 
These transformed variables were used for all later analyses.  
 
Multicollinearity 
The independent variables were checked for multicollinearity in two ways. First, the 
correlations between the independent variables were explored. Second, collinearity 
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statistics (i.e., tolerance, variance inflation factors) and collinearity diagnostics (i.e., 
condition index, variance proportions) were computed for each of the regression 
analyses.  
 
Cross-sectional Analyses (Time 1) 
Correlation analyses 
Associations were assessed between the demographic/clinical variables (e.g., age, 
gender etc) and the time 1 outcome variables (anxiety, depression, mental well-being 
and physical well-being), using correlations, t tests and ANOVAs as appropriate, to 
identify significant covariates that would need to be controlled for in later regression 
analyses. Correlations were computed between the TCA variables (e.g., benefit finding, 
illness coherence etc) and the time 1 outcome variables to assess bivariate associations 
between the TCA and psychological adjustment in MS.  
 
 
Regression Analyses  
Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to investigate the three hypotheses 
pertaining to this study. The independent variables were entered in 3 steps for each of 
the time 1 outcome variables (i.e., anxiety, depression, mental well-being and physical 
well-being). Step 1 controlled for covariates by entering demographic/clinical variables 
that were significantly associated with the time 1 outcome variables. Optimism was 
entered in step 2 to test the first hypothesis. The situated (i.e., MS-specific) TCA 
variables (i.e., benefit finding, illness coherence, primary control, secondary control, 
social comparisons, denial of illness impact) were entered in step 3 to test the second 
hypothesis. Entering the situated TCA variables in step 3 after optimism in step 2 
provided an initial test for mediation (hypothesis 3). Any evidence of mediation (e.g., 
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reduction in the size of the beta weight for optimism from step 2 to step 3) was further 
analysed in line with current recommendations (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) to formally 
test hypothesis 3.  
 
Prospective Analyses (Time 2) 
Correlation Analyses  
Associations were assessed between the demographic/clinical variables (e.g., age, 
gender etc) and the time 2 outcome variables (e.g., anxiety, depression etc), using 
correlations, t tests and ANOVAs as appropriate, to identify significant covariates that 
would need to be controlled for in later regression analyses. Correlations were 
computed between the TCA variables (e.g., benefit finding, illness coherence etc) and 
the time 2 outcome variables to assess bivariate associations between the TCA and 
psychological adjustment in MS.  
 
 
Regression Analyses 
Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to investigate the three hypotheses 
pertaining to this study. The independent variables were entered in 4 steps for each of 
the time 2 outcome variables (i.e., anxiety, depression, mental well-being and physical 
well-being). Step 1 controlled for baseline adjustment by entering the relevant time 1 
outcome score. Step 2 controlled for significant covariates by entering 
demographic/clinical variables that were significantly related to the time 2 outcome 
variables. Optimism was entered in step 3 to test the first hypothesis. The situated TCA 
variables (i.e., benefit finding, illness coherence, primary control, secondary control, 
social comparisons, denial of illness impact) were entered in step 4 to test the second 
hypothesis. Entering the situated TCA variables in step 4 after optimism in step 3 
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provided an initial test for mediation (hypothesis 3). Any evidence of mediation (e.g., 
reduction in the size of the beta weight for optimism from step 3 to step 4) was further 
analysed in line with current recommendations (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) to formally 
test hypothesis 3.  
 
Power Analysis 
There were no previous studies that had examined relationships between all of the TCA 
components and anxiety or depression or quality of life in patients with MS. Therefore, 
a medium effect size was assumed for the present study. An initial power analysis with 
power set at .80 and alpha at .05 was run to determine the required sample size for the 
hierarchical regression analysis (Cohen, 1992). Entering three demographic or clinical 
variables in step 1, optimism in step 2, and the 9 TCA variables (benefit finding, 
making sense, primary control, secondary control, positive upward social comparison, 
positive downward social comparison, negative upward social comparison, negative 
downward social comparison and denial of illness impact) in step 3, 114 participants 
were required to detect a medium effect size (at step 3). 
 
Results 
Data Screening  
Skewness and kurtosis statistics were calculated to investigate whether the study 
variables were normally distributed. Considering the demographic/clinical variables 
(see Table 1), the Barthel Index (i.e., MS severity) was found to have a significant 
negative skew (z = -7.55, p <.001). Therefore, a logarithmic transformation was 
performed to reduce the level of skewness to a non-significant level. The MS duration 
variable was found to have a significant positive skew (z = 5.35, p <.001). Therefore, a 
square root transformation was performed to reduce the level of skewness to a non-
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significant level. These transformed variables were used for all later analyses.  
Considering the TCA variables and the outcome variables (e.g., anxiety, depression etc), 
the data for each variable was found to be normally distributed (see Table 2). There was 
no indications of multicollinearity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Ranges, means, standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis for the main study 
variables at time 1 and time 2.  
 
 
Variable Range Mean SD    Skewness  Kurtosis 
    (Z Score)   (Z Score) 
 
Time 1 Perceived Benefits 6-24     16.62     5.21        -1.48       -2.28 
 
 Illness Coherence 5-25  18.24    5.46    -2.61 -1.34 
 
 Personal Control 6-30      17.89     4.95        -0.35 -1.15 
 
  Acceptance                 6-24 16.62 4.53        -1.46 -0.91 
 
  Impact Denial              0-8     5.36  2.08    -2.44 -1.00  
 
  Up Positive Comparison   6-30  21.11    6.95    -2.72 -1.12     
  
  Down Positive Comparison    2-10        7.11 2.48    -2.42        -1.40 
 
  Up Negative Comparison   6-30    11.77 5.12    -2.54 -1.91        
 
  Down Negative Comparison 2-10         5.00     2.21      1.21 -1.66   
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  Optimism                          0-24      12.98     6.09    -1.04 -1.07  
 
  Anxiety                        0-21          8.05     4.44     1.50 -1.11   
 
  Depression                       0-21          6.68  3.74     1.12 -0.86         
 
  Mental Well-being 0-100  44.90 11.04    -2.30 -1.00 
 
  Physical Well-being 0-100  35.40 10.35     2.88  0.13  
 
Time 2 Anxiety                        0-21          7.89     4.39     1.26 -0.76          
 
  Depression                       0-21          6.99  3.71     0.73         -0.37 
 
  Mental Well-being 0-100  43.48 11.48     0.16    2.06 
 
  Physical Well-being 0-100  34.35 10.56    -0.88          -0.32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-sectional Analyses (Time 1) 
 
Correlational Analyses 
 
Associations were assessed between the demographic/clinical variables (e.g., age, 
gender etc) and the time 1 outcome variables (e.g., anxiety, depression etc), using 
correlations, t tests and ANOVAs as appropriate, to identify significant covariates that 
would need to be controlled for in later regression analyses (See Table 3).  
 
Age correlated significantly with anxiety (r(110) = -.19, p = .04) and mental well-being 
(r(110) = .28, p = .003) such that greater age was associated with lower anxiety and 
higher mental well-being. Females reported significantly lower levels of depression 
(t(110) = 2.21, p = .030) and higher physical well-being (t(110) = 2.04, p = .044) than 
males. Married participants had significantly lower levels of depression (t(110) = 2.02, 
p = .046) than single participants. Employment status was significantly related to 
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anxiety (F(2, 109) = 9.55, p < .001), depression (F(2, 109) = 8.85, p < .001), mental 
well-being (F(2, 109) = 8.34, p < .001) and physical well-being (F(2, 109) = 8.20, p 
< .001). Therefore, two dummy codes were created for the subsequent regression 
analyses to represent employment status.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Relationships between the demographic/clinical variables and the time 1 
outcome variables.  
 
                   Time 1 Outcome Variables…………………… 
Variable  Anxiety  Depression  Mental Well-being  Physical Well-being
   
 
Age   r(110)    -.19*   -.16  .28**  -.10  
MS Duration r(110)    -.17   -.12    .21*   -.11 
MS Severity r(110)    -.13   -.24*  .14     .55*** 
 
 
 Anxiety    Depression  Mental Well-being  Physical Well-being 
 Variable                 Mean  (SD)    Mean  (SD)        Mean   (SD)            Mean   (SD) 
 
 
Gender:   Male 8.11 (3.91)   8.04 (3.81) 42.67 (11.97)   31.90   (9.53) 
 Female 8.04 (4.62)   6.25 (3.63) 45.60 (10.70)   36.51 (10.41) 
 t(110)  0.08  2.21*  1.20   2.04*  
 
Marital Status:  
  Single 7.93 (4.52)   7.52 (3.60) 43.42 (11.20)   34.34 (9.61) 
 Married 8.14 (4.41)   6.00 (3.74) 45.93 (10.89)   36.13 (10.85) 
 t(110)   0.24   2.02*   1.18             0.90  
 
Employment:    
Employed 7.61 (4.07)   5.09 (3.55) 46.34 (10.55)  39.50 (11.26) 
 Unemployed 10.02 (4.79)    8.26 (3.77) 41.18 (11.89)  34.49 (8.94) 
Retired 5.62 (4.44)      6.81 (2.88) 48.44 (8.81)  29.93 (8.04) 
F(2, 109)    9.55***         8.85***   8.34***            8.20*** 
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Medication: 
   Pain  No 7.85 (4.54)   6.76 (3.59) 44.55 (11.56)  36.48 (10.24) 
 Yes 8.53 (4.22)   6.50 (4.11) 45.69 (9.84)   32.92 (10.31) 
 t(110)   0.75   0.33      0.50         1.69 
 
Fatigue No  7.97 (4.44)   6.55 (3.67) 45.17 (10.98)  35.77 (10.38) 
 Yes 9.50 (4.51)   9.00 (4.47) 40.02 (11.83)   28.89 (7.96) 
 t(110)   0.82  1.57   1.11                          1.60 
         
   Depression No 7.85 (4.36)   6.60 (3.66) 44.84 (11.20)  35.57 (10.26) 
 Yes 10.10 (5.00)   7.50 (4.55) 45.44 (9.73)  33.63 (11.65) 
 t(110)  1.54   0.72    0.16             0.57 
 
   Relapse No 8.19 (4.50)   6.52 (3.89) 44.53 (11.52)  34.36 (10.08) 
 Yes 7.88 (4.41)    6.88 (3.57) 45.35 (10.51)  36.69 (10.64) 
 t(110)  0.37     0.51    0.39             1.19  
        
MS Diagnosis:    
 Relapsing Type 8.01 (4.30)   6.32 (3.73) 45.93 (10.67)  37.31 (10.45) 
 Progressive Types 8.15 (4.84)   7.55 (3.68) 42.42 (11.69)  30.81 (8.64) 
 t(110)  0.15   1.60    1.54         3.15** 
   
MS Status:  
 Stable  7.49 (4.37)   5.97 (3.57) 46.88 (10.53)  38.11 (10.18) 
 Unstable 9.00 (4.44)   7.86 (3.75) 41.59 (11.18)  30.88 (9.08) 
  t(110)   1.76   2.66**   2.52*            3.79** 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
Participants with a progressive type of MS had significantly lower physical well-being 
(t(110) = 3.15, p = .002) than participants with a diagnosis of relapsing/remitting type 
MS. Participants with a stable condition had significantly lower levels of depression 
(t(110) = 2.66, p = .009), higher mental well-being (t(110) = 2.52, p = .013) and higher 
physical well-being (t(110) = 3.79, p = .006) than participants with an unstable 
condition. MS severity was correlated significantly with depression (r(110) = -.24, p 
= .011) and physical well-being (r(110) = .55, p < .001), such that higher functional 
ability was associated with lower depression and higher physical well-being. MS 
duration correlated significantly with mental well-being (r(110) = .21, p = .025) such 
that a longer duration was associated with higher mental well-being.  
 
Correlations were computed to assess bivariate relationships between the TCA variables 
and the time 1 outcome variables (see Table 4). Anxiety was found to correlate 
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significantly with acceptance (r(110) = -.44, p < .001), denial (r(110) = -.35, p < .001), 
upward negative comparisons (r(110) = .40, p < .001), downward negative comparisons 
(r(110) = .45, p < .001) and optimism (r(110) = -.51, p < .001), such that high levels of 
anxiety were associated with low levels of acceptance, low levels of denial, high levels 
of upward negative comparisons, high levels of downward negative comparisons and 
low levels of optimism.  
 
Depression was found to correlate significantly with perceived benefit finding (r(110) = 
-.25, p = .009), illness coherence (r(110) = -.21, p = .024), acceptance (r(110) = -.42, p 
< .001), denial (r(110) = -.36, p < .001), upward negative comparisons (r(110) = .49, p 
< .001), downward negative comparisons (r(110) = .42, p < .001)  and optimism (r(110) 
= -.48, p < .001),  such that high levels of depression were associated with low levels of 
perceived benefits, low levels of illness coherence, low levels of acceptance, low levels 
of denial, high levels of upward negative comparisons, high levels of downward 
negative comparisons, and low levels of optimism. 
 
Table 4. Correlations between predictor variables and outcome variables at time 1.  
 
                   Time 1 Outcome Variables…………………… 
 Anxiety  Depression  Mental Well-being  Physical Well-being 
Predictor Variables   
 
Perceived Benefits .03  -.25**      .12    -.09 
Illness Coherence  -.15 -.21*      .13     .16 
Personal Control  -.09 -.20      .09     .08 
Acceptance      -.44*** -.42***                .37***    .12 
Denial  -.35*** -.36***     .20*     .17 
Upward Positive .09  -.11                -.01     .01 
Downward Positive  -.12 -.16  .15    -.12 
Upward Negative .40***   .49***    -.43***   -.17 
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Downward Negative .45***   .42*** -.39***   -.19* 
Optimism  -.51*** -.48***   .48***   -.03 
 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
Mental well-being was found to correlate significantly with acceptance (r(110) = .37, p 
< .001), denial (r(110) = .20, p = .035), upward negative comparisons (r(110) = -.43, p 
< .001), downward negative comparisons (r(110) = -.39, p < .001) and optimism (r(110) 
= .48, p < .001), such that high levels of mental well-being were associated with high 
levels of acceptance, high levels of denial, low levels of upward negative comparisons, 
low levels of downward negative comparisons and high levels of optimism. Physical 
well-being was found to correlate significantly with downward negative comparisons 
(r(110) = -.19, p < .043), such that high levels of physical well-being were associated 
with lower levels of downward negative comparisons. 
Regression Analyses at Time 1 
 
Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to investigate the three hypotheses 
pertaining to this study. The independent variables were entered in 3 steps for each of 
the time 1 outcome variables (i.e., anxiety, depression, mental well-being and physical 
well-being). Step 1 controlled for significant covariates (ie., demographic/clinical 
variables), step 2 tested the first hypothesis by entering optimism and step 3 tested the 
second hypothesis by entering the situated TCA variables. Any evidence of mediation 
(e.g., reduction in the size of the beta weight for optimism from step 2 to step 3) was 
further analysed in line with current recommendations (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) to 
formally test the third hypothesis.  
 
Table 5 summarises the regression analysis for the variables predicting anxiety at time 1. 
The control variables entered in step 1 explained 15% of the variance in anxiety, ∆R2 
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= .15, F(3, 108) = 6.52, p < .001, with unemployed status emerging as a significant 
predictor. In relation to hypothesis 1, optimism explained an additional 17% of the 
variance in anxiety when entered at step 2, ∆R2 = .17, F(1, 107) = 27.56, p < .001, with 
unemployed status and optimism emerging as significant predictors. In relation to 
hypothesis 2, the situated TCA variables explained a further 16% of the variance in 
anxiety when entered in step 3, ∆R2 = .16, F(9, 98) = 3.51, p < .001, with unemployed 
status, employed status, optimism, and downward negative social comparison emerging 
as significant predictors. The variables in the final regression equation explained 48% of 
the variance in anxiety, ∆R2 = .48, F(13, 98) = 7.27, p < .001.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Summary of the regression analysis for variables predicting anxiety at time 1 
 
                  Anxiety Outcome Variable at Time 1 
 
Step Predictor Variables  β (Step 1) β (Step 2) β (Step 3) 
 
1 Age    -.07  -.02   .07 
Unemployed vs. Others -.45*** -.34**  -.42*** 
Employed vs. Others  -.18  -.14  -.22* 
2 Optimism     -.44*** -.26** 
3 Perceived Benefits       .10 
Illness Coherence       .08 
Personal Control      -.03 
Acceptance       -.18 
Denial        -.14 
Upward positive       .09 
Downward Positive       .00 
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Upward Negative       .04 
Downward Negative       .22* 
 
∆R2       .15***  .17***  .16*** 
R
2      
.15***  .32***  .48***  
 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
 
In relation to hypothesis 3, a possible mediation effect was indicated as the effect of 
optimism at step 2 reduced in size following the addition of the situated TCA variables 
at step 3. As recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2008), further analyses were 
conducted to test whether the situated TCA variables mediated the effect of optimism 
on time 1 anxiety (hypothesis 3). Optimism was entered with the potential mediators 
(i.e., perceived benefits, illness coherence, personal control, acceptance, denial, upward 
positive comparison, downward positive comparison, upward negative comparison and 
downward negative comparison) as well as age and employment status as covariates. 
The effect of optimism on time 1 anxiety, B = -.32, SE = .06, p < .001, was reduced 
when the situated TCA variables were controlled, B = -.19, SE = .07, p = .006, 
suggesting partial mediation. Using bootstrapping procedures, the total mediated effect 
was found to be significant, B = -.12, SE = .06, CI = -.25 to -.02. Inspection of the 
individual mediator variables revealed that only negative downward comparison 
significantly mediated the effect of optimism on time 1 anxiety, B = -.06, SE = .03, CI = 
-.14 to -.01. 
 
Table 6 provides a summary of the regression analysis for variables predicting 
depression at time 1. The control variables entered in step 1 explained 22% of the 
variance in depression, ∆R2 = .22, F(6, 105) = 5.05, p < .001, with unemployed status 
and MS status emerging as significant predictors. In relation to hypothesis 1, optimism 
explained an additional 18% of the variance in depression when entered in step 2, ∆R2 
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= .18, F(1, 104) = 30.29, p < .001, with employed status, MS status and optimism 
emerging as significant predictors. In relation to hypothesis 2, the situated TCA 
variables explained a further 12% of the variance in depression when entered in step 3, 
∆R2 = .12, F(9, 95) = 2.68, p = .004, with optimism and denial emerging as significant 
predictors. The variables in the final regression equation explained 52% of the variance 
in depression, ∆R2 = .52, F(16, 95) = 6.45, p < .001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Summary of the regression analysis for variables predicting depression at time 1 
 
               Depression Outcome Variable at time 1 
Step Predictor Variables  β (Step 1) β (Step 2) β (Step 3) 
 
1 Gender   -.12  -.14  -.13 
Marital status   -.09   .00  -.01 
Unemployed vs. Others -.24*  -.08  -.16 
Employed vs. Others   .13   .25*   .19 
MS severity -.05  .01  .02 
MS status    .20*   .17*   .15 
2 Optimism     -.45*** -.23* 
3 Perceived Benefits      -.14 
Illness Coherence      -.02 
Personal Control      -.02 
Acceptance       -.07  
Denial        -.18*  
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Upward positive       .01 
Downward Positive       .05 
Upward Negative       .10 
Downward Negative       .15 
 
∆R2       .22***  .18***  .12** 
R
2      
.22***  .40***  .52*** 
  
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
 
In relation to hypothesis 3, a possible mediation effect was indicated as the effect of 
optimism in step 2 reduced in size following the addition of the situated TCA variables 
in step 3. As recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2008), further analyses were 
conducted to test whether the situated TCA variables mediated the effect of optimism 
on time 1 depression (hypothesis 3). Optimism was entered with the potential mediators 
(i.e., perceived benefits, illness coherence, personal control, acceptance, denial, upward 
positive comparison, downward positive comparison, upward negative comparison, 
downward negative comparison) as well as gender, marital status, employment status, 
MS severity, and MS status as covariates. The effect of optimism on time 1 depression, 
B = -.28, SE = .05, p  < .001, reduced when the situated TCA variables were controlled, 
B = -.14, SE = .06, p = .015, suggesting partial mediation. Using bootstrapping 
procedures, the total mediated effect was found to be significant, B = -.13, SE = .04, CI 
= -.23 to -.06. Inspection of the individual mediator variables revealed that only denial 
significantly mediated the effect of optimism on time 1 depression, B = -.04, SE = .03, 
CI = -.11 to -.01. 
 
Table 7 provides a summary of the regression analysis for variables predicting mental 
well-being at time 1. The control variables entered in step 1 explained 22% of the 
variance in mental well-being, ∆R2 = .22, F(5, 106) = 6.02, p < .001, with age and MS 
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status emerging as significant predictors. In relation to hypothesis 1, optimism 
explained an additional 12% of the variance in mental well-being when entered in step 2, 
∆R2 = .12, F(1, 105) = 18.20, p < .001, with age, MS status and optimism emerging as 
significant predictors. In relation to hypothesis 2, the situated TCA variables entered in 
step 3, ∆R2 = .08, F(9, 96) = 1.39, p = .20, failed to produce a significant increment in 
the amount of variance explained in time 1 mental well-being, with only MS status and 
optimism emerging as significant predictors of mental well-being. The variables in the 
final regression equation explained 42% of the variance in mental well-being, ∆R2 = .42, 
F(15, 96) = 4.50, p < .001. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Summary of the regression analysis for variables predicting MCS at time 1  
 
              Mental Well-Being Outcome Variable at Time 1 
 
Step Predictor Variables  β (Step 1) β (Step 2) β (Step 3) 
 
1 Age     .24*   .20*   .18 
Unemployed vs. Others  .22   .13   .18 
Employed vs. Others  -.04  -.06   .02 
MS duration    .15   .03   .02 
MS status   -.27**  -.23**  -.21* 
2 Optimism      .38***  .22* 
3 Perceived Benefits       .07 
Illness Coherence      -.07 
Personal Control       .00 
Acceptance        .08 
Denial        -.03 
Upward positive      -.10 
Downward Positive       .07 
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Upward Negative      -.18 
Downward Negative      -.12 
 
 
∆R2       .22***  .12***  .08  
R
2      
.22***  .34***  .42*** 
 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
In relation to hypothesis 3, a possible mediation effect was indicated as the effect of 
optimism at step 2 reduced in size following the addition of the situated TCA variables 
in step 3. As recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2008), further analyses were 
conducted to test whether the situated TCA variables mediated the effect of optimism 
on time 1 mental well-being (hypothesis 3). Optimism was entered with the potential 
mediators (i.e., perceived benefits, illness coherence, personal control, acceptance, 
denial, upward positive comparison, downward positive comparison, upward negative 
comparison, downward negative comparison) as well as age, employment status, MS 
duration and MS status as covariates. The effect of optimism on time 1 mental well-
being, B = .68, SE = .16, p  < .001, reduced when the situated TCA variables were 
controlled, B = .41, SE = .19, p = .034, suggesting partial mediation. Using 
bootstrapping procedures, the total mediated effect was found to be significant, B = .26, 
SE = .13, CI = .05 to .58. However, inspection of the individual mediator variables 
revealed none of them significantly mediated the effect of optimism on time 1 mental 
well-being.  
 
Table 8 provides a summary of the regression analysis for the variables predicting 
physical well-being at time 1. The control variables entered in step 1 explained 35% of 
the variance in physical well-being, ∆R2 = .35, F(6, 105) = 9.58, p < .001, with MS 
severity and MS status emerging as significant predictors. In relation to hypothesis 1, 
optimism failed to explain additional variance in physical well-being when entered in 
step 2, ∆R2 = .00, F(1, 104) = .63, p = .43. However, MS severity and MS status 
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emerged as significant predictors. In relation to hypothesis 2, the situated TCA variables 
failed to produce a significant increment in the amount of variance explained in physical 
well-being when entered in step 3, ∆R2 = .08, F(9, 95) = 1.53, p = .15. At step 3, only 
MS severity, MS status and denial emerged as significant predictors. The variables in 
the final regression equation explained 43% of the variance in physical well-being, ∆R2 
= .43, F(16, 95) = 4.65, p < .001. In relation to hypothesis 3, no mediation analyses 
were performed as optimism was found to be non-significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Summary of the regression analysis for variables predicting PCS at time 1.  
 
                      Physical Well-being Outcome Variable at Time 1 
Step Predictor Variables   β (Step 1) β (Step 2) β (Step 3) 
1 Gender     .02   .02   .04 
 Unemployed vs. Others  -.09  -.07  -.07 
Employed vs. Others   -.17  -.15  -.16 
MS Severity     .43***  .44***  .39*** 
MS Diagnosis     .04   .03  -.04 
MS status    -.22*  -.22*  -.20* 
2 Optimism      -.07  -.12  
3 Perceived Benefits       -.06  
Illness Coherence        .13  
Personal Control        .05 
Acceptance         .06  
Denial          .22*  
Upward positive       -.03 
Downward Positive       -.16 
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Upward Negative        .12 
 Downward Negative       -.09 
 
∆R2        .35***  .00   .08  
R
2       
.35***  .35***  .43*** 
 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
  
Prospective Analyses (Time 2) 
 
Correlational Analyses 
 
Associations were assessed between the demographic/clinical variables (e.g., age, 
gender etc) and the time 2 outcome variables (e.g., anxiety, depression, mental well-
being and physical well-being), using correlations, t tests and ANOVAs as appropriate, 
to identify significant covariates that would need to be controlled for in later regression 
analyses (See Table 9).  
 
Age correlated significantly with anxiety (r(92) = -.24, p = .02) such that greater age 
was associated with lower anxiety. Females reported significantly higher physical well-
being (t(92) = 2.21, p = .030) than males. Employment status was significantly related 
to depression (F(2, 91) = 5.05, p = .008), anxiety (F(2, 91) = 5.71, p = .005) and 
physical well-being (F(2, 91) = 5.56, p = .005). Therefore, two dummy codes were 
created for the subsequent regression analyses to represent employment status.  
 
Participants with a progressive type of MS had significantly lower physical well-being 
(t(92) = 2.68, p = .009) than participants with a diagnosis of relapsing-remitting type 
MS. MS severity was significantly correlated with depression (r(92) = -.38, p < .001) 
and physical well-being (r(92) = .51, p < .001), such that higher functional ability was 
related to lower levels of depression and higher physical well-being. MS duration 
correlated significantly with mental well-being (r(92) = .21, p = .047), such that longer 
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duration was associated with higher mental well-being. Participants with stable 
conditions had significantly lower levels of depression (t(92) = 4.03, p < .001) and 
higher physical well-being (t(92) = 3.57, p = .001) than participants with unstable 
conditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Relationships between the demographic/clinical variables and the time 2 
outcome variables.  
 
                   Time 2 Outcome Variables…………………… 
Variable  Anxiety  Depression  Mental Well-being  Physical Well-being
   
 
Age   r(92)   -.24*   -.14  .09   -.09  
MS Duration r(92)   -.07   -.11    .21*   -.08 
MS Severity r(92)   -.20   -.38***  .17     .51*** 
 
 
 Anxiety    Depression  Mental Well-being  Physical Well-being 
 Variable                 Mean  (SD)    Mean  (SD)        Mean   (SD)            Mean   (SD) 
 
 
Gender:   Male 7.36 (3.61)   7.55 (3.83) 45.18 (12.10)   30.09  (8.14) 
 Female 7.86 (4.38)   6.50 (3.39) 42.96 (11.32)   35.65 (10.92) 
 t(92) 0.48  1.23     0.79    2.21*  
 
Marital Status:  
  Single 7.49 (4.12)   7.02 (3.13) 42.86 (11.52)   32.90 (9.19) 
 Married 7.91 (4.23)   6.54 (3.44) 43.87 (11.54)   35.29 (11.34) 
 t(92)  0.48   1.04      0.42              1.07  
 
Employment:    
Employed 7.59 (4.16)  5.59 (3.48) 44.20 (10.80)  37.87 (12.51) 
 Unemployed 9.45 (4.49)    8.16 (3.37) 40.28 (12.81)  33.91 (8.90) 
Retired 5.79 (2.91)    6.79 (3.16) 46.44 (10.13)  29.18 (6.31) 
F(2, 91)          5.71**           5.05**        2.13              5.56** 
     
Medication: 
   Pain  No 7.45 (4.51)  6.50 (3.44) 43.72 (12.15)  35.55 (10.75) 
 Yes 8.43 (3.34)  7.32 (3.66) 42.90 (9.91)   31.51 (9.69) 
 t(92)   1.03  1.04      0.31  1.71 
 
Fatigue No  7.58 (4.13)  6.57 (3.41) 43.64 (11.49)  34.75 (10.68) 
 Yes 10.17 (4.89)  9.33 (4.23) 41.17 (12.14)   28.38 (6.75) 
 t(92)   1.47 1.89     0.51 1.44 
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   Depression No 7.53 (4.12)  6.73 (3.43) 44.05 (11.33)  34.15 (10.75) 
 Yes 9.78 (4.66)     6.89 (4.40) 38.10 (12.17)  36.25 (8.91) 
 t(92)  1.53  0.13      1.49   0.57 
 
   Relapse No 7.75 (4.11)  6.98 (3.73) 42.51 (11.95)  33.34 (9.53) 
 Yes 7.74 (4.35)   6.47 (3.24) 44.62 (10.93)  35.56 (11.67) 
 t(92)  0.10 0.71      0.89             1.02  
        
MS Diagnosis:    
 Relapsing Type 7.60 (4.02)  6.45 (3.38) 43.64 (11.31)  36.14 (10.96) 
 Progressive Types 8.11 (4.67)  7.48 (3.78) 43.08 (12.11)  29.90 (8.08) 
 t(92)  0.54  1.30      0.21          2.68** 
   
MS Status:  
 Stable  7.35 (4.40)  5.77 (3.25) 44.66 (12.25)  36.98 (11.02) 
 Unstable 8.50 (3.73)  8.63 (3.25) 41.19 (9.60)  29.25 (7.40) 
  t(92)  1.26  4.03***    1.40                          3.57*** 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
Correlations were computed to assess bivariate relationships between the TCA variables 
and the time 2 outcome variables (see Table 10). Time 2 anxiety was found to correlate 
significantly with perceived benefits (r(92) = .28, p = .006), acceptance (r(92) = -.31, p 
= .003), denial (r(92) = -.34, p < .001), upward negative comparisons (r(92) = .29, p 
= .044), downward negative comparisons (r(92) = .34, p < .001), optimism (r(92) = -.38, 
p < .001), time 1 anxiety (r(92) = .75, p < .001), time 1 depression (r(92) = .32, p 
= .002), time 1 mental well-being (r(92) = -.51, p < .001) and time 1 physical well-
being (r(92) = -.21, p = .039), such that high levels of anxiety were associated with high 
levels of perceived benefits, low levels of acceptance, low levels of denial, high levels 
of upward negative comparisons, high levels of downward negative comparisons, low 
levels of optimism, high levels anxiety at time 1, high levels of depression at time 1, 
low levels of mental well-being at time 1 and low levels of physical well-being at time 1.  
 
Time 2 depression was found to correlate significantly with illness coherence (r(92) = -
.28, p = .007), personal control (r(92) = -.28, p = .005), acceptance (r(92) = -.36, p 
< .001), denial (r(92) = -.26, p = .010), downward positive comparisons (r(92) = -.22, p 
= .031), upward negative comparisons (r(92) = .35, p < .001), downward negative 
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comparisons (r(92) = .30, p = .003), optimism (r(92) = -.35, p < .001), time 1 anxiety 
(r(92) = .48, p < .001), time 1 depression (r(92) = .72, p < .001), time 1 mental well-
being (r(92) = -.49, p < .001) and time 1 physical well-being (r(92) = -.59, p < .001), 
such that high levels of depression were associated with low levels of illness coherence, 
low levels of personal control, low levels of acceptance, low levels of denial, low levels 
of downward positive comparisons, high levels of upward negative comparisons, high 
levels of downward negative comparisons, low levels of optimism, high levels of 
anxiety at time 1, high levels of depression at time 1, low levels of mental well-being at 
time 1 and low levels of physical well-being at time 1.  
Table 10. Correlations between time 1 predictor variables and time 2 outcome variables.  
 
                          Time 2 Outcome Variables…… 
           Anxiety  Depression  Mental Well-being  Physical Well-
being          Time 1 Predictor Variables 
 
Perceived Benefits .28** -.03 -.13   -.06 
Illness Coherence   -.14 -.28**  .07  .12 
Personal Control   -.06 -.28**  .15  .18 
Acceptance   -.31** -.36***  .21*  .12 
Denial   -.34*** -.26**  .24*  .15 
Upward Positive    .12 -.19  .13  .05 
Downward Positive   -.06 -.22*  .18 -.06 
Upward Negative    .29*   .35*** -.25*      -.08 
Downward Negative    .34***  .30** -.25**  -.19 
Optimism   -.38*** -.35***  .33*** -.02 
 
Time 1 Outcome variables 
 
Anxiety .75***  .48***    -.56***  -.10 
 
Depression .32**     .72***    -.36***  -.33*** 
 
Mental Well-being   -.51***    -.49***      .58***   .04 
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Physical well-being   -.21*    -.59***      .18    .81*** 
 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
Time 2 mental well-being was found to correlate significantly with acceptance (r(92) 
= .21, p < .045), denial (r(92) = .24, p = .022), upward negative comparisons (r(92) = -
.25, p = .016), downward negative comparisons (r(92) = -.25, p = .009), optimism (r(92) 
= .33, p < .001), time 1 anxiety (r(92) = -.56, p < .001), time 1 depression (r(92) = -.36, 
p < .001) and time 1 mental well-being (r(92) = .58, p < .001), such that high levels of 
time 2 mental well-being were associated with high levels of acceptance, high levels of 
denial, low levels of upward negative comparisons, low levels of downward negative 
comparisons, high levels of optimism, low levels of anxiety at time 1, low levels of 
depression at time 1 and high levels of mental well-being at time 1. 
 
Time 2 physical well-being was found to correlate significantly with time 1 depression  
(r(92) = -.33, p < .001) and time 1 physical well-being (r(92) = .81, p < .001), such that 
high levels of physical well-being at time 2 were associated with low levels of 
depression at time 1 and high levels of physical well-being at time 1. 
  
Regression Analyses at Time 2  
Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to investigate the three hypotheses 
pertaining to this study. The independent variables were entered in 4 steps for each of 
the time 2 outcome variables. Step 1 controlled for baseline adjustment, step 2 
controlled for significant covariates, step 3 tested the first hypothesis by entering 
optimism and step 4 tested the second hypothesis by entering the situated TCA variables. 
Any evidence of mediation (e.g., reduction in the size of the beta weight for optimism 
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from step 3 to step 4) was further analysed in line with current recommendations 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008) to formally test the third hypothesis.  
 
Table 11 provides a summary of the regression analysis for variables predicting time 2 
anxiety. Time 1 anxiety explained 54% of the variance in time 2 anxiety at step 1, ∆R2 
= .54, F(1, 92) = 115.39, p < .001. The addition of the control variables in step 2, ∆R2 
= .01, F(3, 89) = .61, p = .61, optimism in step 3 (hypothesis 1), ∆R2 = .00, F(1, 88) 
= .21, p = .65, and the situated TCA variables in step 4 (hypothesis 2), ∆R2 = .05, F(9, 
79) = 1.14, p = .35, failed to produce significant increments in the amount of variance 
explained in time 2 anxiety. Time 1 anxiety emerged as a significant predictor of time 2 
anxiety at each of the 4 steps. Benefit finding also emerged as a significant predictor at 
step 4. The variables in the final regression equation explained 60% of the variance in 
time 2 anxiety, ∆R2 = .60, F(14, 93) = 9.06, p < .001. In relation to hypothesis 3, no 
mediation analyses were performed as optimism was found to be non-significant.  
 
Table 11. Summary of the regression analysis for variables predicting anxiety at time 2.  
 
                   Anxiety Outcome Variable at Time 2 
Step Predictor Variables β (Step 1) β (Step 2) β (Step 3) β (Step 4) 
1  Time 1 Anxiety  .75***   .72***  .71***  .60*** 
2 Age -.10  -.10  -.06  
 Unemployed vs. Others -.11  -.01  -.06 
 Employed vs. Others  .02   .02   .02 
3 Optimism  -.04  -.06 
4 Perceived Benefits   .20* 
 Illness Coherence  -.06 
 Personal Control   .00 
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 Acceptance -.01 
 Denial -.14 
 Upward positive -.03 
 Downward Positive  .02 
 Upward Negative -.08 
Downward Negative  .07 
 
∆R2  .54***   .01            .00                   .05  
R
2 
.54***  .55***  .55***  .60*** 
 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
Table 12 provides a summary of the regression analysis for the variables predicting time 
2 depression. Time 1 depression explained 52% of the variance in time 2 depression at 
step 1, ∆R2 = .52, F(1, 92) = 98.64, p < .001. An additional 6% of the variance in time 2 
depression was explained by the control variables entered in step 2, ∆R2 = .06, F(4, 88) 
= 2.87, p = .028 The addition of optimism in step 3 (hypothesis 1), ∆R2 = .00, F(1, 87) 
= .53, p = .47, and the situated TCA variables in step 4 (hypothesis2), ∆R2 = .07, F(9, 78) 
= 1.57, p = .14, failed to produce significant increments in the amount of variance 
explained in time 2 depression. Time 1 depression emerged as a significant predictor of 
time 2 depression in all 4 steps. MS severity and MS status emerged as significant 
predictors of time 2 depression in steps 2 and 3. The variables in the final regression 
equation explained 65% of the variance in time 2 depression, ∆R2 = .65, F(15, 93) = 
9.27, p < .001. In relation to hypothesis 3, no mediation analyses were performed as 
optimism was found to be non-significant.  
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Table 12. Summary of the regression analysis for variables predicting depression at time 2.  
 
                   Depression Outcome Variable at Time 2 
Step Predictor Variables      β (Step 1)       β (Step 2)    β (Step 3)   β (Step 4) 
 
1 Time 1 Depression .72*** .60*** .57*** .56*** 
2 Employed vs. Others   -.09   -.07 .00 
Unemployed vs. Others   -.12   -.11   -.12  
MS severity   -.19*   -.19*   -.17 
MS status    .16*    .16* .14 
3 Optimism   -.06   -.04 
4 Perceived Benefits .17* 
Illness Coherence   -.06 
Personal Control    -.08 
Acceptance   -.14 
Denial               .00 
Upward positive            -.04 
Downward Positive            -.13 
Upward Negative            -.12 
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Downward Negative            -.03 
 
∆R2  .52*** .06* .00 .07  
R
2 
.52*** .58*** .58*** .65*** 
 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
Table 13 provides a summary of the regression analysis for variables predicting mental 
well-being at time 2. Time 1 mental well-being explained 33% of the variance in time 2 
mental well-being at step 1, ∆R2 = .33, F(1, 92) = 46.11, p < .001. The addition of the 
control variable at step 2, ∆R2 = .00, F(1, 91) = .58, p = .45, optimism at step 3 
(hypothesis 1), ∆R2 = .00, F(1, 90) = .55, p = .46, and the situated TCA variables at step 
4 (hypothesis 2), ∆R2 = .08, F(9, 81) = 1.18, p = .32, failed to produce significant 
increments in the amount of variance explained in time 2 mental well-being. In the first 
three steps, time 1 mental well-being was the only significant independent predictor of 
time 2 mental well-being. At step 4, time 1 mental well-being and perceived benefits 
emerged as significant predictors of time 2 mental well-being. The variables in the final 
regression equation explained 41% of the variance in time 2 mental well-being, ∆R2 
= .41, F(12, 93) = 4.85, p < .001. In relation to hypothesis 3, no mediation analyses 
were performed as optimism was found to be non-significant.  
 
 
Table 13. Summary of the regression analysis for variables predicting MCS at time 2  
 
             Mental Well-being Outcome Variable at Time 2 
Step Predictor Variables         β (Step 1)     β (Step 2)     β (Step 3)     β (Step 4) 
 
1 Time 1 mental well-being  .58***         .56***     .53***          .53*** 
2 MS duration            .07     .05   .02 
3 Optimism          .07   .06 
4 Perceived Benefits       -.26* 
Illness Coherence         .01 
Personal Control         .05 
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Acceptance          .00 
Denial           .07 
Upward positive         .21 
Downward Positive         .02 
Upward Negative         .01 
Downward Negative         .00 
 
∆R2      .33***         .00     .00    .08  
R
2 
.33***   .33***  .33***   .41*** 
 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
Table 14 provides a summary of the regression analysis for the variables predicting time 
2 physical well-being. Time 1 physical well-being explained 65% of the variance in 
time 2 physical well-being at step 1, ∆R2 = .65, F(1, 92) = 171.98, p < .001. The 
addition of the control variables at step 2, ∆R2 = .01, F(6, 86) = .41, p = .87, optimism at 
step 3 (hypothesis 1), ∆R2 = .00, F(1, 85) = .08, p = .78, and the situated TCA variables 
at step 4 (hypothesis 2), ∆R2 = .01, F(9, 76) = .37, p = .95, failed to produce significant 
increments in the amount of variance explained in time 2 physical well-being. At each 
step, time 1 physical well-being was the only significant independent predictor of time 2 
physical well-being. The variables in the final regression equation explained 67% of the 
variance in time 2 physical well-being, ∆R2 = .67, F(17, 93) = 9.31, p < .001. In relation 
to hypothesis 3, no mediation analyses were performed as optimism was found to be 
non-significant.  
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Table 14. Summary of the regression analysis for variables predicting PCS at time 2.  
 
                 Physical well-Being Outcome Variable at Time 2 
Step  Predictor Variables              β (Step 1)     β (Step 2)     β (Step 3)     β (Step 4) 
 
1 Time 1 physical well-being     .81***   .74*** .74***       .73*** 
2 Gender           .03  .04       .03 
Employed vs. Others     -.04            -.05      -.05 
Unemployed vs. Others    -.05            -.05      -.03 
MS Severity       .06  .06       .06 
MS Diagnosis       .02  .02       .00 
MS status      -.07            -.06      -.06 
3 Optimism       .02       .02 
4 Perceived Benefits            -.02 
Illness Coherence            -.06 
Personal Control             .07 
Acceptance              .06 
Denial               .03 
Upward positive            -.05 
Downward Positive            -.02 
Upward Negative             .10 
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Downward Negative            -.05 
 
∆R2          .65***   .01  .00       .01 
R
2  
.65***   .66*** .66*** .67*** 
 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Previous research has found that the TCA explained significant and large amounts of 
variance in psychological adjustment in response to various health threats other than 
multiple sclerosis (MS) (Moore et al., 2006; Helgeson, 1999). The overall aim of the 
present study was to examine the extent to which the theory of cognitive adaptation 
could explain variance in adjustment among patients with MS. 
 
Cross-sectional findings 
In relation to the first hypothesis that dispositional optimism would explain significant 
amounts of variance in baseline adjustment (i.e., anxiety, depression, mental well-being 
and physical well-being) after significant covariates were controlled for, the regression 
analyses revealed that dispositional optimism explained significant amounts of variance 
in baseline anxiety, depression and mental well-being but not physical well-being. 
Higher levels of optimism predicted lower levels of anxiety, lower levels of depression 
and higher mental well-being. These results are consistent with previous research that 
has found that greater optimism was related to lower depression (Fournier, Ridder & 
Bensing, 1999, 2002; Gold-Spink, Sher & Theodos, 2000; Ridder, Schreurs & Bensing, 
2000), lower anxiety (Fournier, Ridder & Bensing, 1999, 2002) and higher quality of 
life (Ridder, Schreurs & Bensing, 2000) in patients with MS.  
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In relation to the second hypothesis that the situated TCA variables (i.e., benefit finding, 
illness coherence, primary control, secondary control, social comparisons and denial) 
would explain significant amounts of variance in baseline adjustment (i.e., anxiety, 
depression, mental well-being and physical well-being) over and above that of 
dispositional optimism, the regression analyses revealed that the situated TCA variables 
explained significant amounts of variance in baseline anxiety and depression but not 
mental well-being or physical well-being. In particular, negative downward social 
comparisons predicted higher levels of anxiety, while higher levels of denial predicted 
lower levels of depression and greater physical well-being. These findings are broadly 
consistent with previous research that has found that negative downward social 
comparisons were related to poorer adjustment (Dibb et al., 2006a, 2006b; King et al., 
2009; Van der Zee et al., 1999) as well as research that has found that higher levels of 
denial were related to lower levels of depression and higher quality of life (Helgeson, 
1999, 2003; Moore et al., 2006), although Stiegelis et al. (2003) found that denial was 
not related to adjustment.  
 
In relation to the third hypothesis that the situated TCA variables (i.e., benefit finding, 
illness coherence, primary control, secondary control, social comparisons and denial) 
would mediate the relationship between dispositional optimism and baseline adjustment 
(i.e., anxiety, depression, mental well-being and physical well-being), mediation 
analyses revealed that the situated TCA variables partially mediated the relationship 
between dispositional optimism and anxiety, dispositional optimism and depression, and 
dispositional optimism and mental well-being.  
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However, when the situated TCA variables were examined individually, only negative 
downward social comparisons were found to mediate the relationship between optimism 
and anxiety, while only denial was found to mediate the relationship between optimism 
and depression. The findings from the present study suggest that lower levels of 
optimism may make individuals more likely to engage in negative downward social 
comparisons, which in turn may be related to higher levels of anxiety. The findings also 
suggest that higher levels of optimism may make individuals more likely to engage in 
denial, which in turn may be related to lower levels of depression. These findings 
support the TCA but can be contrasted to those of previous cross-sectional studies that 
have found that greater optimism reduced the use of denial as a coping strategy, which 
in turn led to lower levels of anxiety and depression (Carver et al., 1993; Brissette, 
Scheier & Carver, 2002).   
 
Overall, these results provide modest support for the TCA as only partial support was 
found for each of the three hypotheses in this study cross-sectionally. To date, research 
investigating the TCA has typically employed cross-sectional designs. However, this 
has made it difficult to establish the direction of any significant relationships. Therefore, 
the present study also assessed the ability of the TCA to explain variance in adjustment 
prospectively.  
 
Prospective findings 
In relation to the first hypothesis that dispositional optimism would explain significant 
variance in adjustment prospectively, controlling for baseline adjustment and significant 
covariates, the regression analyses revealed that dispositional optimism failed to explain 
significant additional variance in anxiety, depression, mental well-being or physical 
well-being. These findings are in contrast to previous research that has found that 
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optimism was related to lower levels of anxiety (Stiegelis et al., 2003), lower levels of 
depression (Karademas, 2006) and higher quality of life (Helgeson, 2003). However, it 
is possible the 3 month follow-up period in the present study may have been too short to 
test this hypothesis as there was little change in adjustment over time; thus, the time 1 
adjustment scores explained large amounts of the variance in the time 2 adjustment 
scores. 
 
In relation to the second hypothesis that the situated TCA variables (i.e., benefit finding, 
illness coherence, primary control, secondary control, social comparisons and denial) 
would explain significant variance in adjustment prospectively over and above 
dispositional optimism, the regression analyses revealed that the situated TCA variables 
failed to explain significant additional amounts of variance in anxiety, depression, 
mental well-being or physical well-being prospectively. As stated earlier, it is possible 
the 3 month follow-up may have been too short to test this hypothesis. Despite this 
limitation, benefit finding emerged as a significant independent predictor of anxiety and 
mental well-being. However, the direction of these relationships was contrary to the 
predictions of the TCA as greater benefit finding was found to predict higher levels of 
anxiety and lower mental well-being.  
 
Although these findings are contrary to the TCA and previous research that has found 
that greater benefit finding was related to lower psychological distress (Hart et al., 
2008), these findings are consistent with other research that has found that greater 
benefit finding was related to greater psychological distress (Tomich & Helgeson, 2004), 
and poorer mental well-being (Tomich & Helgeson, 2002) prospectively. A number of 
explanations have been offered for this pattern of results (see McFarland & Alvaro, 
2000; Tomich & Helgeson, 2004). In particular, benefit finding might be a coping 
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strategy that is employed when faced with increasing anxiety or a coping strategy that 
provokes anxiety when exaggerated perceptions of benefit are challenged by the reality 
of living with the illness.  
 
In relation to the third hypothesis that the situated TCA variables (i.e., benefit finding, 
illness coherence, primary control, secondary control, social comparisons and denial) 
would mediate the relationship between dispositional optimism and adjustment 
prospectively, no mediation effects were found. This is in contrast to previous research 
that has found mediation effects prospectively (Carver et al., 1993; Brissette, Sheier & 
Carver, 2002). Again, it is possible the 3 month follow-up period may have been too 
short to test this hypothesis. 
 
In summary, partial support was found for the TCA cross-sectionally but not 
prospectively. Contrary to the TCA, greater benefit finding was found to predict poorer 
psychological adjustment prospectively. However, this pattern of results provides 
support for research that has suggested that benefit finding might be a coping strategy 
that is used in response to high levels of anxiety or provokes anxiety as exaggerated 
perception of benefits are not matched by the reality of living with MS. Future research 
could explore the role of benefit finding in adjustment to provide greater insight into the 
range of alternative explanations that have been offered for this pattern of results.  
 
Methodological Critique 
The current study has a number of limitations that need to be considered. First, the 
sample was predominantly white female patients who had relapsing-remitting type MS 
(n = 63). Second, the small number of participants with progressive types of MS (n = 33) 
and the exclusion of patients with cognitive impairment (n = 1) may have resulted in a 
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sample that was biased towards lower levels of severity and higher levels of positive 
adjustment. Third, although the response rates at time 1 and time 2 were high (Punch, 
2003), the overall sample size was relatively small. Together with the large number of 
control variables that were sometimes explored in the regression analyses, the statistical 
analyses for this study may have been underpowered at times, increasing the risk of a 
type II error (Cohen, 1988). Fourth, the short follow-up period resulted in the time 1 
adjustment scores explaining large amounts of the variance in the time 2 adjustment 
scores, limiting the amount of variance that was available for the TCA to explain. A 
longer follow-up period may have negated this problem. Fifth, the measure of primary 
control had the lowest internal reliability in this study. Although satisfactory, this could 
partly account for the failure of primary control to predict adjustment as hypothesised. 
Sixth, it has been recommended that the TCA is assessed using both situated and 
dispositional measures (Dennison, Moss-Morris & Chalder, 2009; Tomich & Helgeson, 
2006). This study employed situated measures for each of the TCA components and a 
dispositional measure for optimism. Although the use of a dispositional measure for 
optimism was consistent with previous research (Helgeson, 1999, 2003; Stiegelis et al., 
2003), dispositional measures of optimism cannot be directly compared to situated 
measures of the TCA as they are measuring different constructs (Moore et al., 2006). 
Seventh, the present study replicated one of the limitations of previous research by 
relying on self-report questionnaires. Brennan and Barnett (1998) also questioned the 
extent to which self-report measures may reflect a common underlying dimension of 
negative affectivity. They recommend future research controls for negative affectivity 
as a confounding variable.  
 
Future Research 
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New directions for future research include investigating how the influence of the TCA 
on adjustment changes throughout the course of an illness. Future studies could recruit 
participants during the pre-diagnostic assessment phase and continue to assess them 
across the duration of their illness. Research could also investigate the unexpected result 
that greater benefit finding predicted greater anxiety and lower mental well-being, over 
time. Tomich et al. (2004) suggested this pattern of results may represent a return to 
baseline anxiety at follow-up, a coping strategy that is employed when faced with 
increasing anxiety or a coping strategy that promotes anxiety when exaggerated 
perceptions of benefit are challenged by the reality of living with the illness. These 
theoretical debates could be empirically explored.  
 
Clinical Implications 
 
As discussed previously, the present findings are limited by a number of methodological 
issues. While acknowledging these caveats, it is still possible to draw a number of 
potential clinical implications from the main findings. Considering the cross-sectional 
results, greater optimism was related to lower anxiety, lower depression and higher 
mental well-being. Clinicians could consider psychological interventions that have been 
found to increase levels of optimism. For example, Fresco et al. (1995) suggests 
cognitive behaviour therapy may be able to increase optimism in patients with chronic 
illnesses. Second, denial predicted lower levels of depression and higher mental well-
being. Clinicians may need to be aware that denial could be an adaptive coping strategy. 
Third, negative downward social comparisons predicted higher levels of anxiety. 
Clinicians could consider psychological interventions that could target negative social 
comparison appraisals. For example, cognitive behaviour therapy has been found to 
increase positive appraisals in patients with chronic illnesses (Manne & Zautra, 2004). 
However, clinicians may need to consider these implications with caution as none of 
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these findings were supported prospectively in this study and the cross-sectional nature 
of these findings means that the direction of these relationships can be questioned.  
 
Prospectively, greater benefit finding predicted higher levels of anxiety and poorer 
mental well-being. Therefore, clinicians may need to be aware that efforts to find 
benefits may be related to greater psychological distress. However, more research is 
needed as there are a range of alternative explanations for this finding. Future research 
could investigate these alternative explanations to provide greater insight and clearer 
guidance for clinicians.   
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